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Abstract 
The Third Energy Package of the European Commission, enforced in March 2011, 
brought significant changes to the energy market of the European Union while 
implementing anti-monopolistic measure of unbundling. Most of all the measures will 
influence highly monopolised gas-dependent markets of Eastern Europe, especially 
Baltic States, who rush into implementing the measures hoping to gain energy 
independence. By studying a single case of a conflict between Lithuania and Gazprom, 
so far erupted around the new measures, via the analysis of recent events and previous 
actors’ behaviour tendencies, the thesis concludes that, in a short-term perspective, 
Third Energy Package regulations are unprofitable and even dangerous to develop 
within the monopolized gas market of Lithuania taking into account the lack of 
alternative energy sources and gas suppliers as well as of financial reserves for energy 
infrastructure transformation. It is proposed, that factual de-monopolization of the 
energy sector should be realized before implementing relevant administrative 
regulations.  
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Introduction 
On the 30th of June 2011 Lithuanian parliament adopted legislation restraining interest 
of its supplier of natural gas – Russian state-owned natural gas export monopoly 
Open Joint Stock Company Gazprom (Gazprom), that recently also took the position of 
a main energy supplier, due to the Lithuanian energy market factual restructurization 
and gas becoming the main energy source – by setting bounds to it owning and 
operating gas pipelines on the territory of the country, and, by that, initiated an 
international conflict over the gas infrastructure control. The new regulations require 
Gazprom to abandon ownership and control over the gas distributing pipelines on the 
territory of Lithuania and, thus, give up its share in Lithuanian gas distributing company 
Lietuvos dujos. 
 
The initiative had derived from a piece of legislation aimed to reorganize 
European Union’s (EU) common energy market – Third Energy Package1 (TEP). 
According to the Directive 2009/73/EC of the TEP, that concerns common rules and 
states new requirements for the internal market of natural gas (repealing 
Directive 2003/55/EC), suppliers of natural gas to a market may not participate in the 
transportation network operations within the same market (i.e. own and simultaneously 
operate the pipelines within a single market – ‘ownership unbundling’). The strongest 
resonance from the related parties to the new regulations is expected in the Baltic 
States’ region due to the high monopolization of gas market by Gazprom - the sole 
supplier of gas to all the three republics with intensive gas consumption tendencies (gas 
being an important constituent of the local energy markets).  
 
Despite Gazprom with the support of Russian government for many years had been 
expressing strong protest to the development of the Package as to one confronting its 
interests and breaking the conditions which previous bilateral agreements with the 
member-states are based on (Kristalinskaya 2011), the TEP was enacted and subsequent 
procedures started. Lithuania became the first country to initiate implementation of the 
                                                 
1 European Union’s TEP was adopted by the European Commission in 2009, came into force in March 
2011 and has to be fully implemented by the member-states by 2014 
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new regulations in accordance with the TEP requirements. The officially stated aim of 
Lithuania implementing the Directive is to de-monopolize its’ gas market (complying 
the primary aim of the TEP on the local level) and open access to the existing pipelines 
for the potential suppliers, other than Gazprom, by getting independent control over the 
pipeline system.  
 
The given thesis analyses the correspondence of the aims pursued by the 
European Commission with the factual development of the TEP on the Lithuanian 
energy market and particularly its gas sector related Directive to the actual 
consequences of implementation already caused or initiated by the new regulations 
developed on a single-state level. On the example of Lithuanian case, it aims to prove 
the hypothesis that such radical actions in legal market structure transformation (by the 
means of intervention of new political regulations), that do not comply with a factual 
market development direction, establish a dangerous situation that threatens energy 
security of the country, casually causing economic loses, in the states, with a gas as a 
main energy source, highly dependent on gas imports from a monopolist supplier until 
alternative energy sources and prospect possibility to diversify suppliers are found.  
 
To study the notion there is used a qualitative approach to the analysis of a single case 
study. The method of the study is rather inductive: in the result of a single case study to 
make a broader conclusion that might be applicable to other cases with similar 
characteristics, under similar circumstances. So, the qualitative explanatory analysis of a 
single case is made via the method of survey, data collection and analysis.  
 
The first two parts of the following thesis are shaping the framework for the following 
study. The first discusses gas relations between the European states in general and 
Russian gas export-monopoly Gazprom. There are highlighted the perspective of EU 
integrating its energy market and taken a closer look at the aspects of EU-Russia 
‘interdependency’ in the gas trade. Separately is given an overview on the relations of 
highly gas dependent energy markets of Baltic States with their only supplier of the fuel 
- Gazprom. The second part is dedicated to observation of the specifics of TEP and its 
most problematic gas market regulation – unbundling. It brings out how the radical 
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regulations of the TEP will influence the European gas market and states the concerns 
of the foreign suppliers over the new regulations. 
 
In the third part there are brought out particular characteristics of the Lithuanian gas 
market and the country’s behavior in relations with its main energy supplier, in the 
conditions of broader European energy market. Thereafter, it is analyzed what practical 
changes the implementation of the TEP brought to the state’s gas market and how the 
Gazprom, as its main player, reacted on these developments of Lithuanian government. 
Deriving from the arguments of the first two parts it is concluded what risks the 
implementation of TEP causes for Lithuanian energy security and what alternative 
actions could be undertaken to minimize them. By that the chapter aims to answer the 
question if TEP regulations are generally profitable to develop within the monopolized 
gas markets of the Baltic States (on the example of Lithuanian case) under the condition 
of having no alternative energy sources or suppliers as well as no financial reserves to 
allow additional costs for factual energy sector transformation. 
 
The framework of the thesis is built on the legislative initiative of the 
European Commission – Third Energy Package (Commission Directive 2009/73/EC) 
and the previous studies on the gas market structures and the phenomena of EU’s gas 
market liberalisation (including ‘unbundling’). In the theoretical part, that aims to stress 
the high dependency of the energy sectors of the Baltic States (as well as the entire 
Eastern European region) on the imports of gas from Russia and the lack of strategic 
support in relevant negotiations from other EU member-states, there are used two 
approaches to define specifics of bilateral relations of the representatives of the region 
with their partner in the sphere of gas trade. First framing theory that classifies states 
according to their approaches to energy security deriving from their characteristics 
(published in the paper of The World Bank Group in 2005) is used to define the 
common regional energy security priorities. It also allows defining priorities of 
Lithuania in its energy policy and analyse functioning of the market through the prism 
of those priorities. The classification of European states on their perception of the EU’s 
strategic partner of energy supplies – Russia is conducted through the classification 
method proposed by Leonard and Popescu. Using the worked out classification the 
 8 
 
differences in approaches are brought out and the lines of behaviour of the countries of 
the EU choose while dealing with their partner on the common questions of energy 
supplies are defined. It helps not only to analyse the specialties of Lithuanian political 
approach towards the supplier-country, but also to underline the impossibility of 
development of a common foreign energy policy approach due to the lack of common 
perceptions of the foreign policy target among the EU member-states so important for 
the energy security of the Baltic States.   
 
Due to the lack of scientific materials on the particular issue of the discussed case of 
TEP implementation in Lithuania, as outcomes of the conflict are still not clear and thus 
not many scholars undertake studies on the phenomena, in the empirical part of the 
thesis the gas conflict is studied basing mostly on the current information on the issue 
emanating from press releases covering permanent situation on the gas market of 
Lithuania and relevant open sources to observe the current outcomes of the development 
of the initiative. Applying the constructed conditions to the theoretical framework of the 
two first parts and basing on the model of Lithuanian energy market proposed by 
Januliunas and Molis in their work on Challenges and perspectives of energy security of 
Lithuania there is constructed the general picture of Lithuanian energy market as a part 
of a the broader energy market arena and concluded how, in this conditions, under the 
influence of the EU policies, development of the TEP regulations influence energy 
security of Lithuania.  
 
As in the near future other countries of the EU, and particularly of the Baltic States 
region, are planning to start development of the TEP regulations on their territories it is 
important to analyze the efficiency of the Package on a single-state experience to escape 
unwilling consequences in a vaster scale. By paying attention to the most problematic 
region in the sense of liberality of the gas market the given theses observes, up till now, 
the only case within the conditions of the particular region and concludes if TEP may be 
considered the best solution for transformation and liberalization of the gas market from 
the point of view of securing permanent energy supplies on a reasonable price to a 
single country, with an overall monopolized energy sector. 
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1 The EU–Russia energy relations  
Over the last years energy became a universally important political issue because of its 
strategic importance to every nation’s security. Gas is an essential energy source due to 
its economic efficiency and sustainability. Until recently the EU, being the biggest 
importer of natural gas from Russia, has been viewed as a balancing counter-power in 
negotiations over the gas questions and, thus, mutual dependence between Russia and 
the EU was believed to “hardly allow political blackmailing using the gas supplies as a 
political weapon“. (Göhl 2006, 15) In the following chapter it is shown, however, that 
the lack of a common political strategy within the EU puts under doubt the very 
existence of a unified European energy ‘counter power’, threatening mainly the security 
of smaller and economically weaker member states, that are in the energy dependency 
on Russian gas supplies, mostly of the Eastern European region.  
 
1.1 Role of gas in the EU energy sector 
As previously mentioned, gas plays an enormous role in the European energy sector. 
The share of natural gas in the energy consumption of the EU has increased 
significantly during the last decades, and the demand is projected to further increase 
mainly due to the European attempts to facilitate environmental-friendly energy 
sources, making natural gas ‘Europe’s fuel of choice for power generation’. 
(Goldthau 2008, 686, Lucas 2008, 164, Umbach 2010, 1236 in Helén 2010, 4; 
Belkin 2008, 6) Nowadays the share of natural gas in European energy consumption is 
25% while imported is 63%, out of which the imports from Russia compose around 
35% (i.e. 22,5% of the total gas  consumption) (Appendix 1) which makes it a vital 
necessity and at the same time a strategic burden for the EU27 (Helén 2010, 2). 
Moreover, some EU member states (mostly the ones of Eastern Europe) are fully 
dependent on Russian natural gas for their domestic energy consumption (Table 1.1) 
(Belkin 2008, 6), which along with a large share of natural gas in primary energy 
consumption (Appendix 2), makes them vulnerable to any changes- or attempts of 
manipulation with gas supplies.  
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Table 1.1: The countries of the EU with the highest gas import dependency rate 
Country Dependence on 
imported gas in 
2010 
Total gas imports from 
Russia (Gazprom)  
* in relation to the total net 
supplies 
Gas imports from other 
sources  
* in relation to the total net 
supplies 
Estonia 100% 100% 0% 
Finland  100% 100% 0% 
Germany 87% 37.6% 46% 
Latvia  100% 100% 0% 
Lithuania  100% 145.6% 
(exports from storage) 
0% 
Poland 71% 61% 7% 
EU 27 63% 22.5% 40% 
* The data is rounded 
Source: author’s calculations on the data from Eurogas 2011, 8 (Appendix 1) 
 
While demand for natural gas in the EU is constantly growing, its internal reserves and 
production are declining every year. This raises dependency on natural gas imports from 
foreign suppliers. (Eurogas in Zyuzev 2008, 1) Forecasters predict that, if trends 
continue, total natural gas consumption in the EU will double over the next 25 years, 
while European total gas imports are expected to reach slightly over 80% of total 
consumption by 2030. (Belkin 2008, 5-6; Helén 2010, 4; Kefferpütz 2009, 97) This 
situation is justified partly by EU’s green policy and attempts to use cleaner fuel2 and 
partly by its present inability to develop alternative energy sources in required 
quantities. (Grigoriev, Belova 2009, 81) 
 
If to observe Europe as a whole, one may notice the growth of general dependency on 
the imports of gas from Russia. Hereby the main reason is the immobility of gas 
                                                 
2 “Along the ecological dimension both the EU and the International Energy Agency (IEA) view natural 
gas as a transition resource on the way to less carbon intensive and more energy efficient economies using 
more renewable sources of energy. This should mean continued high demand for Russian gas in Europe 
until around 2035.” (International Energy Agency (2011) in Aalto 2012, 8)  
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transporting infrastructure. Other important gas producing countries as Algeria, Libya 
and Iran in theory could supply gas here as LNG, but Eastern European states still lack 
terminals and relevant facilities to store LNG in a necessary quantity. (Göhl 2006, 1; 
Mankoff 2009, vii; Eurogas 2008, 11) Thus, due to the immobility of the pipeline 
infrastructure and costliness of the new constructions, the high dependence on Russian 
gas is likely to exist in the Eastern European member states in a long-time perspective.  
  
1.1.1 Gazprom as a ‘political tool’ 
As all Russia’s fossil energy sources are natural monopolies that provide a large part of 
the state’s GDP, interests of the country are highly merged to the agenda of the relevant 
companies (especially on economic issues3). (Christie 2007 in Losoncz 2009, 146-147) 
Also the natural gas monopoly Gazprom has always been run like a state-owned 
company. Having political actors (e.g. Dmitry Medvedev, before presidency) in the 
head of it and a limited participation of foreign investors (the largest foreign investor is 
the German company E.On Ruhrgas, with a 6% stake) the company tends to promote 
national interests via its commercial policies. (Helén 2010, 11; Kefferpütz 2009, 101; 
Losoncz 2009, 146-147; Youngs 2010, 122) Being a trustworthy government-controlled 
company, Gazprom has been given an exclusive right for export of Russian gas4 
(Pirog 2007, 7; Woehrel 2009, 3), warranting the government control over this 
important revenue item.  
 
Gazprom’s monopoly over the export of gas allows Russian government to control the 
export price5. Profits from the sales of gas to European states are vital for the country’s 
economic growth, as the main income from the gas export is received from this region 
(~70% of the company’s total revenues). (Helén 2010, 11; Pirog 2007, 5-6) Due to the 
                                                 
3 Gazprom’s tax payments on profits account for more than 20% of the Federal budget. (Helén 2010, 11) 
4 Russia’s Duma, with the support of the president of the country, provided the exclusive right to export 
gas to Gazprom when voted to approve the Federal Law ‘On Gas Export’ initiative on 5th of July 2006. 
(Федеральный закон «Об экспорте газа» N 30, 24.07.2006) 
5  Gazprom’s exaggerated export prices allow supply of Russian population with the basic energy needs at 
subsidised prices. (Helén 2010, 11) 
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fact that Russian economy is highly dependent on the effective sale of natural resources 
and especially natural gas, it was believed, that it is dependent on the EU as a main 
consumer (Grigoriev, Belova 2009, 71-72) and, therefore, may not allow itself, or its 
companies, a risk to harm the interests of- or get involved into a conflict with any of the 
EU member states. 
 
1.2 The EU-Russia gas trade interdependency 
The perspective of common interdependency, however, has been proven wrong by the 
recent gas conflicts raised in several CIS countries, EU-Russia’s common transit region, 
resulting in regional cuts of gas supplies and price growth and resonating in the gas 
supply cuts also to several European states in winters of 2006 and 2009 (both involving 
Ukraine – at that time a vital transit country for ~80% of Russian gas flowing to Europe 
(Helén 2010, 5)) that gained the name of ‘Gas Wars’. (ibid, 31) Many scholars doubted 
these actions to be only measures undertaken by Gazprom to stand for its financial 
interest, but saw them as an attempt to exert political pressure on the decisions of the 
local governments in subsidiary questions and confirm the power of Russia in the 
disputed region. (Mankoff 2009, ix)  
 
Thus, in the result of these political contentions Gazprom’s reputation as of a reliable 
supplier to European member-states was irreparably damaged. Some scholars noted the 
company to become ‘an instrument of Russian foreign policy’, rejecting economic 
motives and ready for sacrifices when following a strategic or political aims. 
(Göhl 2006, 6; Helén 2010, 3; Christie 2009, 10-11; Finon, Locatelli 2007, 5) “After the 
gas conflict of 2006, this type of Russian behaviour became the norm, rather than the 
exception, with the ‘gas weapon’ having been used to apply political pressure on the 
Baltic States, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine”. (Helén 2010, 6) Russia made it 
clear that it would not hesitate to use the energy cuts and price manipulation against any 
country or player trying to undermine its political power or threaten its energy security 
– security of demand, maintaining its positions as a main gas supplier to the 
‘near abroad’ region and the EU. (ibid, 3)  
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Moreover, Russia is constantly looking for new commodity markets in other world 
regions to ensure the security of permanent gas demand. Development of LNG industry 
allows it to widen diapason of trade activities in new directions. Thus, it has been 
estimated that Asian region will absorb around 60% of Russian LNG production (from 
2010 to 2018) while Europe will see only 20% of the new supplies. Moreover, the 
closure of Japan’s nuclear reactors that prompted a large portion of the country’s energy 
in the consequence of the ecological catastrophe made the region experience a heavy 
lack of energy and increased the gas demand for power generation may also draw the 
existing gas supply away from Europe. (Herron 2012) 
 
Latest developments within the European energy market, on the other hand, highlighted 
the growing need for gas imports from Russia: several suppliers of gas (such as Libya) 
have recently stopped their import to Europe; Germany and Italy, important importers 
of Russian gas, had given up the use of nuclear power in the wake of the tragedy at the 
Fukushima Nuclear Plant and will additionally require a minimum of 16 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas as a replacement for its nuclear energy projects. (Mazur 2011)  
 
Besides, EU still has no clear alternative to the pipeline gas (and other fossil fuels) on a 
large scale: few member-states are able to pay for the development of nuclear industry 
and not many are willing to use it as a main energy source, the elaboration of renewable 
energy sources is still not effective enough, LNG infrastructure is not fully developed, 
etc. These factors leave Europe stuck in an embrace with ‘unreliable supplies’ of gas 
from Russia, which is getting into an even stronger position on the global energy 
market. (Milov 2006, 12; Aalto 2007, 2011 in Aalto 2012, 1; Finon, Locatelli 2007, 5; 
Kristalinskaya 2011; Herron 2012) 
 
Thus, as the ability of the EU to diversify its energy sources is still limited and some 
regular suppliers tend to leave the market, energy is likely to remain a key component of 
EU-Russia relations (Milov 2006, 12) in a long-time perspective. Meanwhile, “the need 
to ensure greater energy security and better regulation of energy supplies will eventually 
turn energy into a much more politicized issue. Energy, already an important security 
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concern, will continue to shape future military and political relations, especially if there 
is no other option other than oil and gas to satiate growing demand.” (Paillard 2010, 65) 
 
Despite these tendencies, EU still lacks the common energy policy system and, 
therefore, cannot be concerned as a united actor, having no factual means to convert its 
vast gas imports from Russia into real political power. (Ishkauskas 04.06.2011; 
Mankoff 2009, ix) This keeps “asymmetry in dependence [that] is likely to provide 
sources of influence for [more powerful] actors” while dealing with their vulnerable 
partners. (Keohane, Nye 1989, 10-11 in Helén 2010, 32) Recognition of this fact 
resulted in the „intensified effort of the European Commission to unite the EU countries 
behind a common energy policy”. (Göhl 2006, 16)  
 
1.2.1 EU common energy policy, necessity vs. factual perspective 
Even though the idea of creating common EU market in the energy sector is not new the 
perspectives in this context remain vague. (Finon, Locatelli 2007, 15) “Within the 
institutional framework created by European treaties, management of gas and oil 
resources has always remained within the competence of states. … There is no 
collective approach to the problem for gas. Each country developed its own gas market, 
relying on a national monopoly or a market leader to take charge of negotiating 
contracts for imports.” (ibid, 5) 
 
Nowadays, the EU countries import gas and oil from different sources, some having 
diversified their import and others depending on a single supplier. This is a source of 
different interests towards supplier and sources of diversification among the EU states, 
defining different approaches to the development of energy security priorities. Countries 
of Eastern European region, dependent on Russian companies as the main suppliers of 
the consumed gas (Appendix 1: Figure 1), an important energy sources, believe that a 
common European energy policy would ensure them a better negotiating position, 
“increase the security of supply and reduce domination of Russian companies in the oil 
and gas markets”. (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 217-218) Other member states that have 
negotiated good gas import conditions and do have a diversified energy market as well a 
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alternative energy suppliers remain sceptical in the question of statement of a common 
strategy rather looking for bilateral treaties to secure energy supply (e.g. Germany, 
Italy). (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 221; Engelbrekt, Vasilev 2010, 187; Christie 2009, 5) 
 
Thus, even though the term ‘energy security’ is commonly defined as an access to a 
sufficient amount of reliable energy at a reasonable price (Yergin 1988, 111 in 
Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 201) it has a different meaning in the context of every single 
country depending on the specific interests of a particular state. The World Bank Group 
(2005, 4) in its overview of energy security issues proposed specification of five 
different groups of countries “to which different interpretations of energy security (in 
respect of demand and access to energy resources) should apply: 
1. Industrialized states, net importers of energy (e.g., USA, Germany, Japan) 
2. Largest sovereign hydrocarbon exporters (e.g., Norway) 
3. Largest emerging markets with a fast-growing energy demand (e.g., China, India) 
4. Net importers of energy with medium incomes (e.g., Baltic States) 
5. Net importers of energy with low incomes.” (in Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 201) 
(Appendix 5) 
 
Janeliunas and Molis (2006, 204) found that many of the EU states belong whether to 
the first or the fourth groups. Deriving from the characteristics of the states they defined 
three common priority tasks of the European states developing secure energy sector: 
1. to ensure reliable energy supply and functionality of energy infrastructure; 
2. to diversify energy supply sources; 
3. to reduce dependency on energy resource import (by reducing energy intensity and 
switching to alternative or renewable energy resources).  
 
Nevertheless, while the member states are still lacking a common approach to the 
foreign energy relations, despite having similar energy security priorities, the EU 
authorities can hardly agree on a common energy security strategy for the whole Union. 
(Youngs 2010, 129) Member-states continue to pursuit divergent external energy 
policies. (Belkin 2008, 1) Russia – the main supplier of gas to Eastern and Central 
Europe, on its turn, also prefers its exporter to deal with all the European partners on a 
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bilateral basis, which allows controlling the conditions of the deals in accordance with 
the interests of Russian state and the exporting company (economic and strategic). 
(Smith 2008, 2 in Helén 2010, 23)  
 
1.3 EU-Russian gas relations 
Among European member-states, buying gas from Russia, there can be defined two 
general opposing concepts to approach the supplier-state: by the first, Russia is viewed 
as a partner (e.g. three of the European ‘Big Four’ France, Germany, Italy) – state for 
the preservation of bilateral energy long-term agreements, simultaneously trying to 
draw Russia into the inner energy market of the EU on the institutional level; while at 
the other extreme Russia is seen as a threat (particularly strong among the ex-soviet 
Eastern European states6 with the highest energy dependence on Russia, that have 
experienced the Russian use of energy disruptions for political needs). The second 
group advocates a stronger common EU policy on external energy security and states 
for exclusion of Russia from the European energy sector as well as main international 
organisations of the region. (Leonard, Popescu 2007, 2; Youngs 2010, 116, 122; 
Helén 2010, 13) On the very extreme of this group, according to classification proposed 
by the Leonard and Popescu (2007, 2), is Lithuania, along with Poland, having “an 
overly hostile relationship with Moscow … willing to … block any EU negotiations 
with Russia” (Leonard, Popescu 2007, 2).  
 
For the smaller countries of the Eastern European region, with a low energy 
consumption rate (Kefferpütz 2009, 104), the “increasingly cordial bilateral relations 
between key member states [of the EU] and Russia are an additional source of 
frustration and of an increasing feeling of insecurity”. (Leonard, Popescu 2007, 2 in 
Helen 2010, 14) They see this approach to be blocking the development of a common 
coherent EU viewpoint and statement of a strategy for foreign energy policy. 
                                                 
6 “Since then Gazprom has moved into the new EU member states – former Soviet republics (Baltic 
countries) or ex-Comecon (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics) – taking advantage of 
privatisation of the gas industry. Its objective is clearly to maintain its outlets in countries that are heavily 
dependent on its gas. … It is building alliances by swapping assets in sales or distribution, on the one 
hand, and production, on the other.” (Finon, Locatelli 2007, 10) 
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(Helen 2010, 14) Bigger states of the EU, on the other hand, are not willing to give up a 
part of their sovereignty and decision-making power in gas sector to the responsible 
central authorities of the Union that are meant to govern energy relations and negotiate 
gas contracts with the third parties on behalf of the whole Union, aimed to 
counterbalance the market power of Russian seller as it is not profitable to them in any 
sense. (Helén 2010, 13-14) 
 
Thus, the small states of Eastern Europe still remain strategically unprotected under 
threat of possible manipulation of gas supplies. As there is no factual collaboration 
within the European energy market it remains questionable “whether the EU would 
indeed rally to an individual member state’s aid in the case of an ambivalent and 
arbitrary shutdown of gas supplies, particularly when large gas consumers such as 
Germany and Italy would not want to jeopardize their own business relations with 
Russia”. (Kefferpütz 2009, 105)  
 
Technically, both parties, Russian and the EU, realize the need for mutually agreed, 
common legal framework to control the gas market on the political level and provide 
common energy security: “security of demand for Russia (prices and long-term 
volumes); security of supply for EU (prices and permanent delivery)”. 
(Grigoriev, Belova 2009, 76) However, “further institutionalisation of energy relations 
between the EU and Russia is inhibited by the conflicts of interest. The EU is interested 
in depoliticization of natural gas deliveries so that it could integrate natural gas imports 
from Russia into its competitive market, thereby maximise imports” (Losoncz 2009, 
154) while Russia is interested in maintaining the present ‘asymmetric interdependence’ 
of politicised natural gas relations trying to avoid the depoliticization of gas trade. 
(Noël 2008, 2 in Losoncz 2009, 154) 
 
The problem hereby is that the EU, despite not having a common energy policy, is 
attempting to institutionalise the EU-Russia energy relationship, and to align it with the 
market principles (Helén 2010, 2) one-sidedly. While having no valid common strategy 
for energy sector development it is developing legislative acts and tries to export the 
normative and political values of the Union. This institutional approach has met a strong 
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opposition from Russia. “A country reviving its lost power in the international arena 
and pursuing a realist foreign policy7, Russia refuses to embrace the EU’s values and to 
align its legislation with European norms” (Helén 2010, 32-33) especially when it is not 
profitable both economically and strategically, harming the sovereign interests of 
Russia.  
 
1.4 Gas security in the Baltic States  
When talking on the European energy security special attention should be drawn to the 
security of Baltic States (as well as the other post-soviet Eastern-European states) 
which, presently, are in exclusive dependency on the imports of gas from Russia 
(Table 1.1) and, at the same time, geopolitically remain on the periphery of the two 
conventional players. These countries, along with some European Eastern Partnership 
countries, are a target to the “Russian ‘energy diplomacy’, in terms of the post-imperial 
syndrome of the elite and the natural economic causes, such as critical dependence on 
Russian energy supplies”. (Milov 2006, 15) Therefore, “in the past few years, the main 
concern in the Baltic states has been Russian efforts to increase control over the energy 
infrastructure in their countries” (Woehrel 2009, 12), where Gazprom already owns a 
large equity stake in domestic natural gas companies. (ibid) 
 
The concerns of the Baltic States are not groundless. The usage of gas as a mean for 
political influence was registered in the region already in the early 1990s, right after the 
collapse of the USSR, when Russia used energy supply cut-offs (gas and oil) in order to 
affect policy changes in the region (Smith 2004, 6 in Larsson 2007, 79; Elletson 2006 in 
Ciziunas 2008, 287) (e.g. gas cut to Estonia was registered on the 25th of June 1993 as a 
                                                 
7 “Geopolitical realism often predominates in Russian foreign policy thinking, especially when 
approaching bordering states, dominating in which is of a vital importance for the country’s national 
security”. (Light 2008, 15 in Helén 2010, 17-18) “The geopolitical nature of Russian realism with its need 
for a sphere of influence directly undermines the policies and interests of the EU. Firstly, the assumed 
Russian sphere of influence covers a number of EU member states in Eastern Europe. It also comes into 
direct conflict with the European Commission’s ‘Eastern Partnership’, the eastern dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in a number of countries.” (EC 2010a, 2010b in Helén 2010, 18) 
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protest against discrimination of ethnic Russians on the territory of Estonia (Russia cuts 
off gas supply to Estonia 26.06.1993, 5)).  
 
Nowadays, the Baltic States still apprehensively treat all the activities of Eastern 
neighbor that meets a corresponding response from the Russian side. Therefore, while 
supporting the image of Russia being a ‘threat’ and holding to the perception of the 
Eastern neighbor as the ‘Other’ (‘the East’) (Neumann 1999, 162-163; 
Jurkynas 2006, 252) in the structure of international relations (see part 1.3), 
Baltic States distanced themselves from any partnership with Russia and by that lost the 
profits gained of privileged position previously attempted as the ‘near abroad’. 
(Woehrel 2009, 12) By keeping up with this line of behavior Baltic States risk 
provoking another wave of gas cuts or price growth8. Meanwhile, instability in the gas 
import is highly unwilling in the situation when, in accordance with accession 
conditions of the EU, Estonia is obliged to reduce production and usage of its oil shale 
and Lithuanian power plant, that provided the country with most of the consumed 
energy  (Maniokas 2009, 8),  has been closed down.   
 
The latest developments in the regional gas infrastructure – recently launched offshore 
North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream)9 providing straight connection between 
Gazprom and its biggest European consumers (Central and Western Europe) through 
the Baltic Sea – can be also considered as a sign of mistrust to the Baltic States as a 
partner. By choosing the project over the other economically more profitable and easier 
to develop onshore options (Appendix 3) Russia demonstrated having doubts over 
reliability of the Baltic States to be a transit path of its gas pipelines to Central Europe 
and, therefore, minimised their involvement into the transit space (planned to pass only 
Estonian waters), “denying them the economic windfall they would have enjoyed had 
the pipeline’s route passed through their territories”. (Baran 2006, 12)  
                                                 
8 The price for gas for Baltic States has been constantly rising and by now reached the world’s market 
level. (Woehrel 2009, 12) 
9 As Russia’s natural gas exports are transported to European partners by pipelines built through transit 
countries, the security of supply is highly affected by the behaviour of the third parties. The Nord Stream, 
connecting Germany and Russia through the Baltic Sea, is aimed to “reduce risks related to natural gas 
transit by circumventing politically unreliable transit countries”. (Losoncz 2009, 147) 
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Moreover, with the implementation of North Stream Baltic region remained completely 
isolated from the common gas space of the EU. Consequently the region remained only 
a consumer of energy resources without any factual strategic background support, 
negotiating the energy supply conditions with a more powerful partner bilaterally, still 
being highly dependent on its supplies. (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 200; Grabauskas in 
Whist 2009, 182-183; Liuhto 2009, 110; Maigre 2010, 7-8) Besides, this project secured 
Gazprom a possibility to maintain bilateral relations with the main European trade 
partners, escaping necessity of any transit. Thus, while Germany maintains that the 
pipeline will significantly enhance European energy supply and security, a number of 
eastern EU member states (of Eastern Europe) have protested the decision, restoring 
calls for a more coordinated European energy strategy towards foreign suppliers. 
(Polish Press 2005 in Belkin 2008, 4) 
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2 Impact of the Third Energy Package on 
EU’s gas market 
Third Energy Package (TEP) is one of the latest EU regulations (enforced on 
March 3, 2011), initiating substantial structural changes to the gas market architecture. 
(Komlev 2011, 1) One of the TEP’s aims is to deepen internal market liberalization: 
create a free market in the sphere of natural gas trade and distribution. 
(Youngs 2010, 111) Structurally, the Package consists of the two main parts: 
1) ‘Gas Regulation’ on the conditions for access to the natural gas transmission 
networks and 2) ‘Gas Directive’ concerning common rules for the internal natural gas 
market. The purpose of the gas sector regulating part is to deliver all the consumers of 
the natural gas within the EU a choice of “new business opportunities and cross-border 
trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, and higher standards of 
service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability.” 
(Commission Directive 2009/73/EC, 1; Directorate General for Energy, 2) The 
following section studies innovations the TEP brings to the European gas market and 
how it affects the relations with the main supplier to Eastern European states.  
 
2.1 Unbundling 
The stumbling stone for all EU gas market external suppliers became the requirement of 
the directive for the separation of transmission and distribution activities and 
production, as well as other activities related to gas supply of vertically integrated 
companies – request for ‘unbundling’10. (Directorate General for Energy, 3; 
European Commission 2009) It was proposed as an anti-monopoly measure aimed to 
encourage development of full competition on the European gas market: “breaking apart 
national energy champions within Europe would make it harder for large non-European 
firms, such as Gazprom [that nowadays not only delivers gas to the European markets, 
                                                 
10 There are classified four types of unbundling: 1) Accounting unbundling – separation of accounts 
within one and the same operator; 2) Legal unbundling – activities integrated within a single firm should 
be separated and assigned to newly created enterprises, while their actions may remain in the ownership 
of the same shareholders; 3) Functional unbundling – separation of management units within an extant 
company; 4) Ownership unbundling – demerger of the activities into completely independent companies. 
(Cavaliere 2007, 7)  
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but also realizes control over the local pipelines], to negotiate their way into dominant 
positions simply through small number of bilateral deals” (Youngs 2010, 31).  
 
The Directives grant Member States a choice between 3 possible models of unbundling: 
- ownership unbundling (OU); 
- independent system operator (ISO); 
- independent transmission operator (ITO). (Directorate General for Energy, 5) 
 
The Ownership Unbundling – separation of all the participants of gas transmission 
system operators – must take place, if up till now it had been concentrated in the same 
hands. In practice it means that the gas supplier to a market may not own or operate the 
pipelines in the same market, therefore large vertically integrated energy firms are being 
forced to give up the transmission assets such as pipelines to independent companies, 
which would exclusively operate these networks. “Supply and generation companies 
would no longer be allowed to exercise any direct or indirect control over the 
independent network operators.” (Pielow, Ehlers 2008, 4-5)  
Scheme 2.1: Ownership Unbundling 
  
Source: Directorate General for Energy, 6 
 
Situation in some member states where OU is already in place gives „economic 
evidence that full OU is an effective means to ensure choice for energy users and 
encourage investment”. (Pielow, Ehlers 2008, 2) This approach is initially favoured by 
the European Commission. In the original proposal of the TEP, prevention of companies 
with stakes in transmission of gas from being involved in energy generation or supply at the 
same time was the only possible variant of unbundling for all member-states. 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the energy market situation in different 
regions of the EU is not the same and, therefore, the effectively functioning in the UK, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain (Cavaliere 2007, 8) OU may be not suitable for 
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markets of other member-states. Thus, the full OU had been blocked by a coalition of 
market-skeptical member states, led by France and Germany. Under their pressure, the 
Commission came up with assenting to a diluted package of reforms with the two other 
alternative softer schemes of market reformation. (European Commission, 2009) 
 
The alternative model of Independent System Operator allows preservation of 
property of companies over pipelines under condition that management of networks 
should be given to independent company and there will be stiff control from the 
regulator; ISO would operate but not own transmission networks. According to this 
proposal, the network owners should follow decisions of the ISO to finance investments 
in transmission capacity and comply with a ten-year network investment plan proposed 
by it. ISO should be established in the member state and have power to intervene into 
the activities of the operating gas companies; its main function should be to fine the 
companies in case of anti-competitive behaviour. (Euractiv 2008 in Zyuzev 2008, 84)  
Scheme 2.2: Independent System Operator 
 
Source: Directorate General for Energy, 7 
 
Establishment of ISO is expected to remove any incentive for network operator to favor 
their own affiliates and at the same time such structure could make an impact into 
regional market integration while networks of multiple transmission owners would be 
managed by a single ISO (so far such system operates in the UK and the US). 
(Moselle, Harris 2007, 1) 
 
Like ISO Independent Transmission Operator model allows energy companies to 
retain the ownership of their transmission networks. ITO is aimed to compel integrated 
production, supply and transition companies to conform to certain rules to ensure that 
the different sections of one company operate independently (the example of 
 24 
 
successfully operating gas ITO can be found in Belgium – Fluxys is the independent 
operator of both the natural transmission grid and storage infrastructure) (European 
Parliament: Further liberalization of the EU electricity and gas markets; Fluxys web).  
Scheme 2.3: Independent Transmission Operator 
 
Source: Directorate General for Energy, 8 
 
The unbundling is a compulsory part to fulfill to all the member states in the framework 
of the TEP. Many states have already unbundled ownership unilaterally. 
(Youngs 2010, 113) An exception has been made for the states with the closed 
monopolised markets that get all the consumed gas from a single external supplier: the 
EU TEP grants them a delay – they are not obliged (but, they may) to implement 
regulation and undertake actions to implement ‘unbundling’ until they manage to create 
conditions for open markets: to diversify their gas suppliers or work out ways for 
gaining alternative energy sources (e.g. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). 
(European Commission 2007; RAPSI 01.03.2012) 
 
The European Commission sees the new regulation as key to both - internal efficiency 
and external security, hoping that it will encourage diversification of suppliers, by 
laying equal opportunities for competition on the gas market, and open the European 
market for a wider competition, implying to the security of free, non-discriminatory 
access to all interested parties. (Zyuzev 2008, 38; Youngs 2010, 111; 
European Commission, 2007) Moreover, as the Commission is assessed that 
investments directed into the transmission network are insufficient when vertically-
integrated companies have dominant positions in the market, along with raising 
competition, the unbundling is expected to stimulate investment in the infrastructure. 
(Directorate General for Energy, 5). 
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2.2 Problematic aspects of unbundling for external suppliers 
Energy companies of third countries, however, are unwilling to allow accomplishment 
of unbundling. Furthermore, they are not interested in granting mandatory third-party 
access to their energy infrastructure because this can make project financing more 
difficult or even inhibit it, but they insist on negotiated third-party access as it was the 
general practice prior to the adoption of the Second Gas Directive in 2003. 
(Konoplyanik 2008, 110) 
 
“Producer states complain that the EU preaches mutually beneficial, market-based 
solutions, but then urges policies that reduce political dependence on these ‘partners’.” 
(Youngs 2010, 114) The TEP is one of such regulations. EU authorities pass new 
legislation that influences the interests of the third parties unilaterally, not taking into 
account interests of its partners. While talking on the desire to ‘harmonise’ its legal 
system with that of third countries, in particular neighbouring ones, on practice it means 
by that “the ‘export’ of EU internal legislation (acquis communautaire) to third 
countries.” (Konoplyanik 2008, 109)  
 
While, this approach might be reasonable for some transit states and certain energy 
producers that regard the EU as a model for economic development, the big gas 
suppliers, as Gazprom, are willing to remain outside the EU’s legal influence and 
continue to develop and manage their resources independently, maximising the 
collected rents. They neither wish to unbundle their vertically-integrated companies, nor 
to grant mandatory third-party access to their energy infrastructure as it may complicate 
project financing. (ibid, 110)  
 
Out of all the gas suppliers the TEP regulations will mostly affect the interests of 
Gazprom. Out of the northern region suppliers “Norway soon is likely to loose its status 
as a major gas supplier due to its slumping gas reserves, while Algeria and Qatar are 
mostly in the business of supplying LNG rather than pipeline gas and, as a result, they 
are not so closely tied to the pipeline infrastructures” (Kristalinskaya 2011) and, due to 
the lack of relevant storage infrastructure in the region, are currently not able to export 
gas to most of the Easter European states. 
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Gazprom, on its turn, characterised the new regulations to be “legally incompatible with 
the EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement provisions on 
non-discrimination.”  (Youngs 2010, 113) Representatives of the company state that 
“applying TEP principles may have negative consequences for the company’s execution 
of its long-term gas-supply contracts and for the prospects of attracting investments into 
construction projects for new gas pipelines in Europe.” (Kristalinskaya 2011) At the 
moment Gazprom foresees “at least three risks stemming from the systemic model 
change:  1,2) demise in property and operational rights, 3) risks of loosing revenues due 
to pricing model adjustments.” (Komlev 2011, 1) Therefore, “Gazprom Group and the 
Russian Government are closely monitoring the implementation of the TEP … to make 
sure that the damage caused by this process to the Company's interests will not go 
beyond the bare minimum”. (Komlev 2011, 4)  
 
As the only country that buys gas exclusively from Gazprom that has so far started the 
implementation of the proposed regulations is Lithuania, the case is seen as a test of the 
TEP efficiency. Therefore, Gazprom tries to stand for its interests in this case, aiming to 
restrain further development and factual implementation of the TEP regulations. 
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3 Lithuania energy market transformation   
“Without having much freedom for manoeuvring in bilateral relations with Russia, most 
of the hopes in Lithuania … are related to [development of] the EU 
Common Energy Policy.” (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 215) Therefore, since becoming a 
part of the EU, Lithuania has been diligently restructuring different aspects of its 
policies in accordance with relevant regulations of the Union. (Maniokas 2009, 1-2) In 
the framework of the European green energy policy Lithuanian energy market also had 
to overcome several radical changes.  
 
Most important of these changes was the informal condition for Lithuanian membership 
in the EU for closure of Ignalina NPP, which previously provided the country with 80% 
of the consumed energy. (Maniokas 2009, 8) Closure of Ignalina NPP (Unit 1 in 2004 
and Unit 2 in the beginning of 2009) became a turning point in Lithuanian energy sector 
that ended its nuclear energy period. Hence, gas became the most important energy 
source in the country and, therefore, the most vulnerable energy topic. “After being a 
net exporter of electricity for more than two decades … Lithuana has changed its status 
to importer overnight” (Sekmokas 2010), which rose the question of Lithuania’s energy 
sector insecurity.  
  
Hoping to secure its gas market Lithuania took a supportive position contributing to the 
implementation of TEP regulations that have a function of gas market liberalisation. 
(Ishkauskas 04.06.2011) Lithuania became the first EU country that receives a 100% of 
its gas demand from a single supplier (Gazprom) to implement the TEP, directed 
against the functioning of monopolies. Moreover, it chose the most astringent way of 
market transformation – ownership unbundling – which radically contradicts with the 
interests of Gazprom on the local market. 
 
Before turning to the analysis of the impact of TEP on the Lithuanian energy market 
and the reasons for eruption of a certain case it is necessary to look at the question 
broader and study the specifics of the local gas market. The following chapter first 
observes the specialties of Lithuanian energy sector and thereafter turns to the 
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Lithuanian behaviour as of a member of the European energy market and relations with 
its only gas supplier (Gazprom), as well as studies difficulties emerged under the 
influence of market restructurization. Finally, the conflict that emerged between 
Lithuania and Gazprom due to the implementation of TEP’s requirement for 
unbundling11 is analysed. Thus, the following chapter discusses Lithuania’s priorities in 
maintaining energy security and concludes if the TEP regulation became a successful 
development for the Lithuanian energy security of the nearest future. 
 
3.1 Lithuanian gas sector and energy security 
One of the important complications of Lithuanian inner gas market is that a large share 
of the biggest gas importer and distributor, controller of country’s gas transportation 
system AB Lietuvos dujos belongs to Gazprom. (Janeliunas 2009, 212) Combining the 
role of gas supplier with that of pipeline system co-owner and operator Gazprom owns a 
share of 37,1%, enjoying an the rotating board chairmanship (38,9% belong to German 
ally E.OE Ruhrgas, 17,7% to the Ministry of Energy of Lithuania, and 6,3% belongs to 
some smaller shareholders) (Picture 3.1). This makes Gazprom also an important player 
on the inner gas market of Lithuania giving it an essential control over the whole sector. 
(Fedorov 7.04.2011) 
 
Picture 3.1: The structure of AB Lietuvos dujos shareholders (as of 31.12.2011)  
 
 
Source: AB Lietuvos dujos web (http://www.dujos.lt/) 
                                                 
11 Lithuania drives to fully implement new rules on ‘unbundling’ by the end of 2014 (Comte 27.02.2012) 
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Gas that Lithuanian Lietuvos dujos buys from Gazprom at the moment takes 80% share 
on the country’s inner heating market (20% is taken by eco-fuel) and, therefore, the 
price of Lithuanian electric energy and heating is in a direct dependency on Russia. The 
price for gas for Lithuania has been constantly growing, since 2005 it grew in four 
times. (Fedorov 7.04.2011) In compliance with the theory of Boulding (1959, 124) who 
stated, that the hostility demonstrated by one country invokes corresponding reaction 
from the other part in the bilateral international relation, such a price change is in the 
direct dependency on evolution of Lithuanian development of “an overly hostile 
relationship [towards] Moscow” (Leonard, Popescu 2007, 2). Nowadays, the price for 
gas for Lithuania is the highest in Europe. (Jakniunite 2012, 133) Gazprom recently 
once again refused Lithuania in a discount for gas (received by Estonia and Latvia) for 
required 15% as Lithuania, on its turn, was not willing to buy pre-crisis gas quantities 
(common offer to the Baltic States), considering requirements of Gazprom to be an 
economic intimidation. (Topalov 30.08.2011)  
 
Meanwhile, general economic state of Lithuania, that is still trying to overcome the 
consequences of the economic crisis of 2008 (e.g. by cutting social subsidies, salaries 
etc; rising taxes), has been constantly worsening. On the level of a private consumer: 
Lithuanian citizens, having the average salary of about 580 euro and pensions of 230 
euro, pay for the heating in winter between 50-200 euro per month (the older house, the 
higher price). Thus, by gaining a discount for gas, Lithuanian government would higher 
the level of wellbeing of the country’s population and in general seriously raise the 
economic situation of the consumers. (Energy Expert Centre 28.03.2012) 
 
Traits of Lithuanian economy and energy sector12 suggest that according to the energy 
security schemes classification theory of the World Bank, in detail brought in the 
Appendix 5, it can be also, as the other countries of the region, “ranked among the 
                                                 
12 Lithuania’s characteristics: “GDP per capita is under $10,000, energy consumption in 2001 was 2300 
kg of fuel equivalent per capita annually, i.e. below 3000 kg.” (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 204) 
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countries of the first or fourth group” (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 201), to face two 
principle challenges to its energy security (concerning gas issues):  
1. dependence on external sources of energy - gas supplies from Russia; 
2. growing ‘energy isolation’ due to the Nord Stream construction. (Baran 2006, 33) 
 
Hoping to maintain its energy security independently from the monopolist supplier of 
its main energy source, Lithuanian government rushed to develop further market 
transformation implementing new pan-European anti-monopoly measures for the gas 
market proposed in the TEP (Socor 07.07.2011; Fedorov 7.04.2011), radically protested 
by Gazprom with the support of Russian government. (Youngs 2010, 113) 
 
3.1.1 Dependence on Gazprom for gas supplies 
As stated previously, nowadays, gas became the most important energy source in 
Lithuania. At the same time, Lithuania’s gas sector is 100% dependent on the imports of 
gas from Russian only exporter – Gazprom. Therefore, the closure of Ignalina NPP puts 
under test the very Lithuania-Russia political relations, as makes Lithuania 
overwhelmingly dependent of Russia in its energy security issues and making gas and 
energy a dominating question in the bilateral relations. Until a suitable alternative to 
Ignalina NPP is secured, Lithuania is forced to rely on imported oil and natural gas for 
its electricity. Thus, present geopolitical and economic situation leaves Lithuania no 
choice, but to deal with an ‘unreliable’ energy supplier. (Janeliunas 2009, 197-198) 
 
Dependence on Russian supplies represents a risk for Lithuanian energy security, 
especially taking into account Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy. Therefore, 
experts of different fields – politicians, economists, national security experts – all 
highlight the vulnerability of the gas question for the energy security of Lithuania. 
(Baran 2006, 3; Janeliunas 2009, 197-198) The advanced complicacy of situation is 
justified by the geopolitical position of Lithuania on the regional gas transport map 
(Appendix 4): the country is separated from the gas transit corridors and, acting only as 
a consumer of Gazprom’s gas, can be easily cut off the supplies. (Janeliunas, Molis 
2006, 208) The start-up of Eord Stream pipeline brought up additional concerns for 
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Lithuania being cut off the transit completely by a possibility of building a spur to 
Kaliningrad bypassing Lithuania. Before its construction Lithuania was the only transit 
way to transport gas to Russia’s separately situated territory, which was believed to give 
certain protection against usage of gas embargo13. (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 215) 
 
Thus, Lithuania’s dependence on Gazprom can be determined by six main factors: 
1) Gazprom being the only supplier of gas to the gas-dependent market of Lithuania; 
2) Gas is transported to Lithuania through the only Minsk-Vilnius-Kaliningrad pipeline 
that is also controlled by Gazprom (Map 3.1.1); 3) as the system of Lithuania’s gas 
pipelines is not integrated into the European network or other alternative extraction 
zones, there is no possibility to supply Lithuania with gas from alternative sources; 
4) Gazprom is one of the biggest stockholders of the main Lithuanian gas operator 
Lietuvos dujos, which means that for Lithuania it is not rational or even impossible to 
implement any policy that would contradict the interests of Gazprom; 5) no gas storage 
facilities – Lithuania does not have capacities to store natural gas and use the reserves in 
case of necessity and even if such a gas storage facility would be built, in reality the 
main shareholders would be Gazprom and its German partner E.OE Ruhrgas; 
6) Lithuania does not have possibilities to deliver, recast or store large quantities of 
liquid natural gas (LNG), except recently started talks with Norwegian company on the 
possibility of renting a floating LNG terminal. (Janeliunas 2009, 197-198; 
Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 209) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This approach is, however, more of a psychological self-trick, as “gas transit to Kaliningrad has never 
been a reliable instrument of Lithuanian energy security” (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 215), which has been 
proven in February of 2004 when “Gazprom punished Beltransgas and simultaneously suspended gas 
supply to Lithuania and Kaliningrad”. (Janeliunas, Molis, 213-214) 
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Map 3.1.1: Gas pipelines on the territory of Lithuania  
 
Source: OAO Gazprom web  
 
Therefore, while many Western European states do not support the energy integration 
considering it to be unprofitable Lithuania has been actively supporting it and already 
started factual straightening of regional cooperation on the energy questions with its 
neighbor-states. Authorities of all the three Baltic States on different levels started to 
coordinate their actions of energy security, cooperating in initiating important 
developments. The main common projects in the sphere of energy sector development 
are dedicated to the creation of electricity bridges14 aimed to unite electricity systems of 
the neighbouring states, plans for construction of a new nuclear reactor (with an 
economic help from the EU) (Baran 2006, 18, 25; Maigre 2010, 5) and, in the gas 
sector, the need for natural gas- and LNG storages has been paid a lot of attention to, as 
a way for saving reserves and by that reducing dependency on permanent supply. The 
LNG storage was planned to be built with the financial support of the EU in Latvia to 
guarantee sustained gas supply to all the three Baltic republics. 
(Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 213-215)  
 
                                                 
14 At the moment, the country is completely disconnected from both the larger European electricity 
network (UCTE) and the Nordic electricity network (Nordel) (Baran 2006, 2) 
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3.2 Outcomes of TEP implementation  
The latest developments of Lithuania on the way to market liberalization in accordance 
with the broader strategy of the EU became the adoption of the new TEP and the trials 
to implement it on the local gas market. Lithuania became the first Eastern European 
member state with the energy sector on a high extent dependent on Gazprom’s gas 
supplies (Maniokas 2009, 10) that dared to apply the TEP regulations.  The officially 
stated aim of Lithuania implementing the TEP regulations, as mentioned before, is to 
enhance energy security and to de-monopolize the market. Lithuanian representatives 
claim the TEP to be first of all “an instrument for the establishment of a competitive gas 
(and electricity) market”. (Ishkauskas 04.06.2011) With the help of such gas sector 
reorganization Lithuanian government hopes to establish “a transparent competitive 
market mechanism which will ensure free access to network and lowest consumer 
prices”. (Lithuanian energy minister Arvydas Sekmokas in Ishkauskas 04.06.2011) 
While Lithuania is not willing to tolerate the prices three times higher than for some 
other European states, Gazprom does not see reasonable argumentation on why it 
should lower prices for Lithuania. (Fedorov 7.04.2011; Ishkauskas 04.06.2011; Energy 
Expert Centre 28.03.2012)  
 
Nevertheless Lithuanian effort to implement regulations of the TEP resulted in 
development of an international conflict with Russia. An intense conflict started 
between Gazprom and Lithuania right after the 30th of June 2011, when the Lithuanian 
Parliament approved the nationalisation of the Gazprom’s pipeline situated on the 
Lithuanian territory in the framework of the TEP (Jakniunite 2012, 133) despite 
Gazprom’s early notice of introducing gas cuts in case of Lithuania implementing the 
directive. (Savilov 20.09.2010) Moreover, “Russian gas monopoly has threatened to 
raise prices if it’s forced to sell its stake”. (Russia Briefing 15.07.2011) 
 
Gazprom sees TEP regulation-package directed contrariwise its interests. According to 
the requirements stipulated by TEP, the company is expected to divest itself of co-
ownership and de facto control of the company Lietuvos dujos. The new law requires 
separating the existing gas transmission and distribution of pipelines from the Gazprom-
controlled Lietuvos dujos, splitting company into a transport and a trade component. 
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“The latter will be able to continue as gas importer from Gazprom; but the transmission 
pipelines will pass under state control, and the distribution to the end consumers will be 
handled as a distinct business. The law is to take full effect by 2013.” (Socor 7.07.2011)  
 
Besides the unbundling obligation, the TEP is aimed to force Russia to “review its 
natural gas exporting policies so that Gazprom has to start selling the delivered amounts 
of gas for one price along the whole border of the EU.” (Mäe 2012) This initiation, 
however, is not supported by the member states that have so far negotiated a good gas 
price and turn them against the unification of policies and Lithuania is risking remaining 
without the overwhelming support of other member states in implementing this 
regulation package as a part of constructing common energy policy. (ibid) This 
initiative already created further tensions with Russia (Jakniunite 2012, 133) and so far 
Lithuania has to deal with them on its own.  
 
Gazprom proposes that by implementing the regulations Lithuanian government is only 
seeking an excuse to nationalize the Lietuvos dujos and by that gain control over the  
gas industry of the country (that is of a vital importance in the present conditions of the 
energy market, where gas takes the largest share of all the consumed energy sources). 
(Ishkauskas 04.06.2011) As a confirmation to such understanding Lithuanian 
government expressed an intention to abolish privatization of Lietuvos dujos if Russia 
will not agree with the conditions of Lithuania: to lower the price and pull through the 
OU requirements. Deputy Minister of foreign affair of Russia Mr. Titov named such 
plans to be a straight violation of liabilities of Lithuania on the bilateral governmental 
agreement on the common maintenance and support for relevant investments of 1999; 
according to him, restitution of the property of Lietuvos dujos shareholders would be a 
pure despoliation (in Fedorov 7.04.2011). 
 
3.2.1 Gazprom turning to court 
‘Negotiating process’ between the two countries turned into the systematic statements 
of recriminatory demands to each-other technically not really arriving to a constructive 
dialogue that would lead to reaching a compromise. The both sides seem to be unwilling 
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to make acquiescence. Therefore, while Lithuania, against all the odds, has been 
implementing regulations of the TEP, believing them to provide security from the 
Russian monopolistic behavior, Gazprom turned to court “seeking international 
arbitration against the Lithuanian government over EU gas market reforms implemented 
by the state” (RIA Novosti & The Moscow News, 01.03.2012) believing them to be 
illegal in the legal conditions shaping Lithuania’s gas market. 
 
First, Gazprom turned to the arbitrary court of Stockholm against the Lithuanian Energy 
Ministry asking to declare actions of Lithuania illegal violation of the previously 
reached agreement of Lietuvos dujos shareholders, whose interests would be damaged  
in case of successful development of the new regulations. At the moment the case is 
under consideration, but the court already mentioned that the position of Gazprom is 
quite justified to win the case on the merits. (Topalov 01.03.2012) 
 
Lithuania wasn’t expecting such reaction of Gazprom especially after reaching the 
agreement (with participation of the European Commission) on 28 February 2012 to 
continue talks on restructuring the country’s gas market in compliance with the TEP. 
(RIA Novosti & The Moscow News, 01.03.2012) What is not taken into account 
hereby, are the commentaries given by Lithuania’s representatives following the 
negotiating meeting, stating that in any case the TEP regulations will be developed on 
its territory by 2014, by which it one-sidedly drew a line under the negotiations stating 
its conclusive position on the dispute. Thus, Lithuania seemed to be supporting two 
overlapping strategies: while claiming its willingness to continue talks it systematically 
realises the requirements of the package keeping up with the stated deadlines. 
(Topalov 01.03.2012) 
 
Therefore, in several days after the meeting (in March of 2012) Gazprom turned to the 
arbitrage court of the UN Assambly protect its investments into the Lietuvos dujos 
(where it still holds a share of 37,1%) and to stand for its rights to own the pipelines on 
the territories of other states, in particular, Lithuania. (Topalov 01.03.2012) The 
agreements on the investments were contracted on an intergovernmental level (besides 
Russia and Lithuania Germany was also participating while its company holding a share 
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of 38,9% of Lietuvos dujos) and, thus, become an intergovernmental issue. (Aliev 
02.03.2012) Therefore, on the opinion of Gazprom, the question on the protection of 
investments is in the competence of UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law) and should be appraised in the relevant authorities. (Topalov 
01.03.2012; RIA Novosti & The Moscow News, 01.03.2012) Moreover, Russia has 
intentions to contest TEP at the WTO, when it becomes an active member, as it violates 
bilateral agreements concluded on the governmental level. (Penchuk, Adomaitis 
01.03.2012) 
 
According to the opinion of an expert on energy questions Bogdan Zikov (in Aliev 
02.03.2012) Gazprom’s resort to an international arbitrage witnesses the wish to stand 
for its interest on an official, legal way not using its monopolist position, influencing the 
thwart partner with the economic ‘countermeasures’. This behavior also stresses the 
wish of Gazprom to continue talks with Lithuania searching for compromise. At the 
same time, with its actions Russia already clearly demonstrated its willingness to stand 
for its property in Lithuania with all possible means. The concerns of Russia are 
reasonable as the outcomes of this ‘trial case’ will determine the future development of 
its gas relations with the EU as a whole. The results of this conflict will demonstrate 
effectiveness of the TEP in accomplishment of its main aim of market 
de-monopolisation and in case of success, if the court will recognise the right of 
Lithuania to implement constrained privatisation of the transportation system, the 
regulation will be implemented all around the Union and, thus, put under threat all the 
other infrastructural actives of Gazprom (as well as of other energy companies) on the 
territory of the EU. (Aliev 02.03.2012) 
 
At the moment it is difficult to predict the outcome of Lithuanian-Gazprom trial 
negotiations. (Losoncz 2009, 155) Hereby, an important role is played by Russian 
government that is unwilling to accomplish relevant legal harmonisation with the EU. 
Partly that is because the Russian institutional and regulatory system is incompatible 
with that of the EU, partly because of political reasons (ibid). Within the so far erupted 
case it wishes to save its strategic influence in the Baltic States’ region and is not ready 
to give up its positions. Lithuania, on its turn, is desperately struggling for energy 
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independence. Such radical counter-standing of interests is blocking maintenance of 
rational negotiations and is not likely to lead to a commonly profitable outcome. 
 
Thus, even though Lithuania, as well as the other Baltic States, in their energy security 
on a large extent relies on the support of the European member states it has to be taken 
into account, that EU still does not have a well-constructed functioning common energy 
policy (as well as no common regulating organs) and, thus, cannot counter-stand the 
supply monopolies as a single consumer. Therefore, each member state takes all the 
decisions concerning energy relations with other countries independently on the 
bilateral basis and, therefore, has to take the responsibility for its actions itself, not 
counting on any support, in case of a relevant conflict, from the other states that are 
unwilling to gain neither economic, nor strategic losses and, therefore, will hardly be 
eager to get involved into any confrontation with important partners. Thus, also the 
current conflict, while having a decisive role for the whole Union, remains a bilateral 
conflict that threatens exclusively Lithuanian energy security (no straight involvement 
of the other states), and commercial interests of Gazprom (and consequently Russia as a 
whole (see part 1.1.1)). 
 
3.2.2  Lithuania diversifying its energy market  
Realising that the current conflict threatens the security of gas supplies Lithuania started 
looking for strategic diversification of the energy sector, searching for the alternative 
sources and suppliers that could replace Gazprom’s gas on its energy market and allow 
it a liberalised functioning. Nowadays, one of the most realistic, in the sense of 
development, and preferable projects is the rent of a floating LNG terminal from 
Norwegian company Hoegh that would allow providing Lithuania with a tangible 
amount of LNG. (Kulikov 05.03.2012; rus.Delfi.lv 28.03.2012) This project, however, 
contradicts with the previously developed project, supporting common intentions of the 
Baltic States, to build a relevant terminal in Latvia. Without the participation of 
Lithuania the terminal becomes unprofitable and will hardly be supported by the EU. 
Thus, in the long-term perspective the cooperation with Norway on LNG supplies, as 
currently proposed, threatens energy security of the whole region. (Kulikov 05.03.2012) 
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Moreover, the price for the support of LNG from Norway has not been yet negotiated 
and, thus, it cannot be clearly stated if importing of LNG from the new source would be 
more profitable than the current deals with Gazprom. Besides, Gazprom may demand 
penalties for breaking up the agreement and abandoning the gas imports. The long-term 
source of the LNG supplies also remains undetermined – due to the diminishing 
reserves of gas in Norway this source is rather short-term. On the other hand, if the 
costs for the LNG (terminal rent and imports) will be profitable it may become a serious 
argument in further negotiations with Gazprom over the gas prices. 
(Kulikov 05.03.2012) But, in any case, in the nearest future perspective the possible 
supplies of LNG will replace only 1 bn out of required 3,5 bn cubic meters energy 
consumed per year, which is not enough to fully satisfy the demand for energy and, 
unless also the other alternative sources are rapidly developed, high dependency on 
natural gar imports from Russia remains.  (Kulikov 05.03.2012) 
 
Renewable energy resources are also not an option to replace natural gas on the local 
energy market. “Winds, solar, hydroelectric and geothermal power … have little 
technical feasibility — let alone economic viability — in Lithuania” (Baran 2006, 22) 
Since Lithuania “is a relatively flat, low-lying country…, there is little potential for 
hydroelectric power. … Nor is Lithuania a good candidate for wind power. According 
to EBRD, the average wind speed in most areas of the country is around 15 kilometres 
per hour (kph). This is insufficient, as most wind turbines in operation today require 
speeds of 10-15 kph as a bare minimum for power generation. … Lithuania is an even 
less suitable candidate for solar and geothermal energy. The country’s high latitude and 
climate conditions are particularly unfavourable for solar power generation.” (Baran 
2006, 22) Thus, at the moment renewables meet only 10% of its energy demands 
(Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 204). 
 
Thus, the only practical possibilities to secure access to energy for Lithuania are fossil 
fuels, in particular – natural gas. Relatively secure gas reserves are assured by 
underground gas storage facilities. (Baran 2006, 29) However, in the only currently 
functioning storage of natural gas in the Baltic States in Latvia the majority of the gas is 
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owned by Gazprom. (ibid, 24-25) Therefore, relevant dependence on permanent gas 
supplies from Russia remains (at least until the new ecologically-friendly nuclear 
reactor is developed (ibid, 22, 25)). 
 
Moreover, natural gas has superiority over other energy sources due to its specialties: 
“Natural gas has the highest energy to carbon ratio of any fossil fuel, making it cleaner 
to burn than coal or oil. It also possesses higher energy efficiency than most 
alternatives.” (Baran 2006, 24) As a large share of the country’s energy infrastructure is 
designed for the usage of gas, which, in compliance with the above mentioned, makes it 
practically and economically irrational (important argument in the conditions of current 
generally poor economic performance of the country (see page 28)) to re-orientate the 
country’s energy sector to other technically available sources. (Fedorov 7.04.2011)  
 
Searching for a more profitable price offer Lithuanian government found an alternative, 
due to impossibility of supplier diversification, in buying Russian gas through the third 
Western European parties. They plan to build a pipeline from Poland to Lithuania and 
thus buy gas from the European country instead of dealing straight with the supplier, 
due to inability of Lithuania to negotiate reasonable price in the bilateral talks. 
(Borodin 13.02.2012) 
 
3.3 Impact of the TEP on Lithuania’s energy security 
Thus, the small Lithuania is convinced that it will reduce its vulnerability in energy 
supply if integrated into a bigger consumer-market. (Losoncz 2009, 149-150) Therefore, 
in the process of gas market de-monopolization in the questions of energy security 
Lithuania strongly reclines on the support from the EU and the prospects of 
development of an integrated European energy market with a commonly coordinated 
foreign energy policy. Integration and compliance to the principle of solidarity in the 
energy sector as well as interconnection of pipelines and grids of all member states is 
expected to create opportunities for energy supply diversification and lead to reduction 
of dependency on a single supplier. (Janeliunas, Molis 2006, 200, 215-216; 
Losoncz 2009, 155-156) Bearing this in mind, Lithuania has been actively 
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implementing all the regulations proposed by the EU aimed at liberalization and inner 
integration within its energy market. 
 
Implementation of TEP in Lithuania clearly took place in an inappropriate time in the 
conditions of an unstable situation on the market: shortly after the monopolization of the 
energy market and in the condition of poor performance of the economy. The country 
appeared to be simultaneously carrying off two conflicting processes: monopolization 
of the market by a single gas supplier in the result of EU’s demand for closure of 
Ignalina NPP in the framework of its green policy and concurrently liberalization of the 
energy market on administrative level by developing new anti-monopoly TEP 
regulations also proposed by the EU. Both processes were initiated as a result of the 
attempts to support the EU energy market integration lead to the conflict of interest 
within the Lithuanian inner energy market.  
 
As a result, nowadays, Lithuanian energy security turned out to be under the threat of 
vulnerability. By implementing measures clearly harming the interest of the only 
current supplier of the main energy source Lithuania itself put its energy security in a 
risky position: striving to maintain its positions on the market Gazprom may become 
eager to once again use the cuts of gas supplies as a mean for manipulation (which 
would be of a catastrophe for the energy sector of the country taking in account the 
share of gas on the local market). Thus, as stated by the Lithuanian Seimas deputy on 
economic questions Julius Veselka (in Parfenova 25.01.2012) that the TEP regulations 
nowadays cannot be effectively implemented in the small import-dependent gas system 
of Lithuania (as well as other states of the region with the similar characteristics) and 
are leading to the rise of prices for gas which at the moment is an indispensible energy 
source on the local market.  
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Conclusion 
Thus, the thesis concludes that the hypothesis stated in the introduction is correct. In the 
present situation when Lithuania is going through the process of constrained energy 
market monopolization, where gas became the main energy source only several years 
ago, implementation of TEP, that initiates radical legal transformation attempting to 
liberalize gas market, causes the dual situation where two contradictory processes are 
simultaneously initiated by one and the same actor. It shapes a risky situation for the 
country’s energy security, provoking the monopoly power to manipulate with the 
energy supplies to maintain its inflective position on the market. Such a strategy is 
clearly inefficient and unprofitable while developed in the present conditions of very 
restricted availability of alternative energy sources.  
 
The combined analysis of the previous tendencies of Gazprom’s behavior and the so far 
tendencies of the reactive actions to the Lithuania’s case of gas market legal 
transformation process it became clear that the TEP regulations initiated by 
European Commission are currently inapplicable in the Baltic States due to the higher 
risk to their energy security. Dependency on gas as the main energy source and, 
therefore, also on Russian government-controlled gas export-monopoly Gazprom as the 
only gas supplier to the region causes the risk to be exposed to manipulative measures 
threatening energy security of the country. The unbundling may be implemented in an 
efficient way only in conditions if the local energy market will first manage to diversify 
the energy sources as well as find alternative perspective suppliers.  
 
If to undertake the process in the other way around it may, not warranty, the long-term 
perspective stimulate energy market’s diversification: faster search for alternative 
sources and suppliers; but, as one may observe on the example of Lithuanian case, on a 
short-term picture it may cause irreparable damage to the energy security as well as 
economic wellbeing of a monopolized consumer state.  
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Moreover, as it is concluded from the Lithuanian case, implementation of the TEP does 
not implicitly cause fulfillment of the primary aim – market liberalization, both, on a 
state-level and with the perspective to provide conditions for energy market 
liberalization over the Union. Due to the necessity for urgent diversification of energy 
sources the latest strategic developments and recent bilateral agreements of Lithuania 
with the third states undermine the common strategies with the neighbor-states for the 
straightening of regional energy security via common projects of energy infrastructure 
development (e.g. construction of LNG terminal in Latvia affected by Lithuanian 
agreement with the Norwegian company). 
 
Thus, member-states should use the officially provided two years to effectively look for 
alternative sources and suppliers, restructuring energy market infrastructure before 
starting an active TEP implementation. Each country needs to carefully analyze its 
energy market on the subject of applicability of the TEP measures and thereafter choose 
the most appropriate method for gas sector unbundling. Even though the two years are 
not an enough long term for a deep analysis of the market and actualization of relevant 
undertakings Baltic States due to their geopolitical location, currently being the most 
vulnerable part of the EU in the sense of energy security, should take all the possible 
time for careful market observation and undertake trials for energy sources 
diversification. It is also important that the countries of the region would undertake the 
related actions in cooperation and simultaneously as a part of the common European 
regional energy strategy as only in that case they would be capable to compose a 
sufficient political counter-power to the Russian energy pressure in the face of its 
exporting gas monopoly – Gazprom.  
 
Lithuania clearly rushed in with the implementation of the TEP regulations basing on 
the moods caused by the strong will for energy independence. Undertaking hasty 
decision to implement the regulations of TEP in the conditions of an unstable market it 
did not take into account real facts stating its complete dependency on a single supplier 
and present inability to provide alternative fuel sources to the consumers in case of 
eruption of a causal conflict. With its hasty legislative developments Lithuania itself 
initiated a conflict with the only supplier of the main energy source for the whole 
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country’s operation causing threat to energy security (mainly price growth or instability 
of the supplies of necessary quantities of gas).  
 
To conclude with, Lithuania needs to revise the strategy concerning international energy 
trades and begin with virtual demonopolisation of the energy market by finding and 
developing supplies of alternative energy sources on the reasonable conditions. After 
the country becomes capable to provide consumers with necessary amounts of energy 
from the other sources on the reasonable conditions it will minimize possible damage of 
gas cuts or the price growth. It will allow to accomplish also the legal market 
demonopolisation – implement relevant legislation (including measures of gas supply 
system ‘unbundling’), without fearing of the only supplier of the main energy source to 
use gas as a source of manipulation while attempting to protect its interests. 
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Appendix 1. Natural gas supplies to Europe 
Figure 1: 3atural gas supplies to Europe by state 
 
Source: Eurogas 2011, 8  
 
Figure 1.1: Total natural gas supplies to Europe by the source states (%) 
 
Eurogas 2011,8  
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Appendix 2. Primary energy consumption in the EU 
Figure 2.1: Share of natural gas in primary energy consumption in 2010 
 Source: Eurogas 2011, 5  
In 2010, primary energy consumption in EU has increased by 3% compared to 2009 and 
the share of natural gas in primary energy increased slightly to 25%.  
Lithuanian energy sector is based on gas for 36% 
  
 
Figure 2.2: Primary energy consumption by fuel (EU) 
Natural gas remains on the second position among the energy sources used in the EU. 
“In 2010, natural gas consumption increased by 7% and renewables by 11% compared 
to 2009. This observed positive parallel trend is expected to continue and to illustrate 
the role of a natural gas as an enabler of the penetration of renewable energy sources. 
Coal and nuclear each increased by 3%, whereas oil decreased by 1%.” (Eurogas 2011, 
5) Over the EU the natural gas demand increased by 7.3% over a year. (Eurogas 2011, 
7) 
 
  
Source: Eurogas 2011, 4  
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Appendix 3. Baltic region alternative pipeline routes 
 
Source: Janeliunas, Molis 2006; 219.  
 
The Yamal I pipeline currently brings natural gas from Russia via Belarus and Poland to 
Germany, and when the question for an additional pipeline rose – the Yamal II was 
proposed to be built along the same route as an alternative to the North Stream. It was 
expected to be considerably cheaper than the offshore pipeline in the Baltic Sea (in 
addition to the fact that onshore construction, Yamal I was constructed in a way to 
allow adding a second pipeline at a later stage). (Murd in Whist 2009, 182) 
Nevertheless, the energy disputes with the transit countries and emerging transit 
complications brought to willingness of both the suppliers (Russia) and consumers (the 
EU) to become independent of politically unstable transit states and therefore agreed on 
the need for route diversification. (Nord Stream 2006b in Whist 2009, 183) 
 
But this, on its’ own, does not automatically imply a need for an expensive and 
politically controversial sub-sea pipeline. (Whist 2009, 183) Therefore, in 2004 “Poland 
and the Baltic States proposed a third alternative, Amber, which would bring Russian 
gas through Latvia and Lithuania to Poland, where it would join the Yamal route to 
Germany” (Götz 2006, 13 in Whist 2009, 183). The Amber pipeline would thus 
contribute to route diversification and bring Russian gas to Germany and the EU 
passing no non-EU transit states. (Whist 2009, 183) Nevertheless, this pipeline would 
lie through the three EU member states that officially stated the adherence to the 
perception of Russia as a political threat and therefore became unreliable partners for 
the Russian side.  
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Appendix 4: Gas pipelines of the Baltic States 
 
Source: East European Gas Analysis (EEGA) , 2.04.2012 
 
Gazprom pipelines (general view) 
  
Source: East European Gas Analysis (EEGA) , 2.04.2012 
 56 
 
Appendix 5: Approaches to energy security in different 
groups of countries 
 Defining characteristic Energy security priorities 
Industrialized 
nations, net 
importers of 
energy 
• Per capita GDP is above $10,065 (1) 
• High level of per capita energy 
consumption: above 3,00 kg of fuel 
equivalent annually (2) 
• Trend to reduce energy consumption (3) 
• The gap between domestic energy 
supply and demand is increasing: the 
demand growth rate is lower than the 
world’s estimated annual average (1.7%) 
till 2030 
• Developed energy infrastructure (i.e, 
almost all population is supplied with 
electricity) (4) 
• Fluctuations of energy prices have a 
relatively weak influence on the economy 
and households (e.g., a $10 price hike of a 
ton of oil will reduce GDP by just 0.5%) 
(5) 
• Ensuring reliable 
energy supply 
• Diversification of 
energy supply sources 
• Ensuring security of 
energy infrastructure 
• Introduction of new 
technologies to reduce 
dependence on energy 
imports 
Largest 
sovereign 
hydrocarbon 
exporters 
• Per capita GDP varies from $260 in 
Chad to $52,000 in Norway 
• A huge difference in per capita energy 
consumption, from 262 kg of fuel 
equivalent annually in Congo to 6,888 kg 
in Qatar 
• Different trends of energy consumption 
• Sufficient reserves of energy resources 
(usually hydrocarbons) for the foreseeable 
• Securing positions on 
strategic markets with 
reasonable prices 
• Diversification of 
energy export market; 
• Ensuring capital and 
investments in 
infrastructure and field 
development 
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future 
• Usually, energy export infrastructure 
requires development 
• The economy is susceptible to cycles of 
wanton growth and decline depending on 
global energy prices (e.g., a $10 price hike 
on a ton of oil pushed Angola’s GDP up 
by 30%) 
• For less developed 
nations in the group: 
meeting the population’s 
basic energy needs, 
creating active demand 
for the energy sector’s 
services 
Largest 
emerging 
markets with a 
fast-growing 
energy demand 
• Different per capita GDP, from $620 in 
India to $6,770 in Mexico 
• A difference in per capita energy 
consumption from 514 kg of fuel 
equivalent annually in India to 2,425 kg in 
South Africa 
• Different trends of energy consumption 
• The demand growth rate is higher than 
the world’s estimated annual average 
(1.7%) till 2030 (e.g., 57% of the 
population in India and 34% in South 
Africa do not have) 
• Fluctuations of energy prices have a 
fairly significant influence on the 
economy and households (e.g., a $10 price 
hike of a ton of oil will reduce GDP by 
more than 0.5% depending on the 
country’s size and energy consumption) 
• Ability to meet the 
growing demand for 
imported energy 
• Diversification of 
energy supply sources 
• Ensuring capital and 
investments in 
infrastructure and field 
development 
• Introduction of new 
technologies to reduce 
dependence on energy 
imports 
• Meeting the 
population’s basic 
energy needs, creating 
active demand for the 
energy sector’s services 
Net importers 
of energy with 
medium 
incomes 
• Different per capita GDP, from $826 to 
$10,065 
• In most countries, per capita energy 
consumption is close to the world’s 
average of 1,631 kg of fuel equivalent 
• Ability to meet the 
growing demand for 
imported energy 
• Ensuring capital and 
investments in 
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annually  
• Different trends of energy consumption 
• The demand growth rate is higher than 
the world’s estimated annual average 
(1.7%) till 2030 
• Underdeveloped energy infrastructure  
• Fluctuation of energy prices have a 
fairly significant influence on the 
economy and households (e.g., a $10 price 
hike of a ton of oil will reduce GDP by 
more than 0.5% depending on the 
country’s size and energy consumption) 
infrastructure and field 
development 
• Meeting the 
population’s basic 
energy needs, creating 
active demand for the 
energy sector’s services 
Net importers 
of energy with 
low incomes 
• Per capita GDP is below $826 
• Per capita energy consumption is about 
or below 500 kg of fuel equivalent 
annually 
• Energy consumption tends to grow 
• The demand growth rate is higher than 
the world’s estimated annual average 
(1.7%) till 2030 
• Poorly developed energy infrastructure 
• Fluctuations of energy prices have a 
fairly significant influence on the 
economy and households (e.g., a $10 price 
hike on a ton of oil will reduce GDP by 
more than 0.75% on the average) 
• Ability to meet the 
growing demand for 
imported energy 
• Ensuring capital and 
investments in 
infrastructure and field 
development 
• Meeting the 
population’s basic 
energy needs, creating 
active demand for the 
energy sector’s services 
Source: World Bank (cited in The World Bank Group 2005, 4) 
Notes: (1) In 2004, based on World Bank Atlas Method, (2) In 2001, according to World Resources 
Institute; (3) World Energy Outlook 2004, IEA, (4) In 2000, according to World Resources Institute, (5) 
World Bank estimates 
 
 59 
 
Kolmanda energiapaketi efektiivsus: 
Gazprom vs. Leedu,  juhtumianalüüs  
Resümee 
 
Euroopa Liidu kolmas energiapakett (The European Union's Third Energy Package), 
mis jõustus 3. märtsil 2011. aastal, toob koos monopolivastase gaasi ja elektri tarnimise 
ja tootmise ülekandest eraldamise meetmetega kaasa märkimisväärsed muudatused 
Euroopa Liidu energiaturul. Kõige enam mõjutavad antud meetmed gaasist tugevalt 
sõltuvaid Ida-Euroopa turge, kus Gazprom-il on gaasitarnimise monopol. Eriti tugev on 
kolmanda energiapaketi muudatuste mõju olukorrale Balti riikides, mis lootes saavutada 
energiaalast sõltumatust kiirustavad, vaatamata Gazpromi vastasseisule, meetmeid 
rakendama. Juba 30. juunil 2011 võttis Leedu Vabariigi Seim vastu esimesed kolmanda 
energiapaketi regulatsioonid ning asus neid kohalikul tasemel rakendama, tekitades 
sellega koheselt konflikti gaasi tarnijaga. 
 
Antud uurimistöö on selgitav juhtumianalüüs, kus analüüsitakse Euroopa Liidu 
kolmanda energiapaketi rakendamisest põhjustatud energiakonflikti Leedu ja Gazpromi 
vahel, selgitades selle tagamaid ja tehes selle põhjal järeldusi. Püstitatud 
uurimisprobleem lahendatakse töös kasutades peamiselt kvalitatiivset uurimismeetodit 
(mõningal määral esineb ka kvantitatiivset analüüsi). Uurimistöö puhul on tegemist 
induktiivse lähenemisega kuna üksikjuhtumit analüüsides tuuakse välja erinevaid leide 
ja tehakse üldisemaid järeldusi, mida on võimalik sarnaste muutujatega ning sarnastes 
tingimustes olevatele juhtumitele laiendada. Juhtumiuuringut tehes kasutati selliseid 
meetodeid nagu vaatlus (method of survey), andmete kogumine (data collection) ning 
selgitav analüüs.  
 
Käesolev väitekiri uurib üksikjuhtumina konflikti Leedu ja Gazpromi vahel, eesmärgiga 
vaadelda kolmanda energiapaketi rakendamise mõju ühe riigi energiajulgeolekule 
Ida-Euroopa regioonis. Väitekiri vastab küsimusele: Kas kolmanda energiapaketi 
määrusi on tulus rakendada Balti riikide kõrgelt monopoliseeritud energiaturgudel 
(Leedu üksikjuhtumi näitel), tingimustes, kus puuduvad alternatiivsed energiaallikad 
või –tarnijad ning piiratud majanduslikud ressursid ei võimalda lisanduvaid kulutusi 
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radikaalseks energiasektori ümberkujundamiseks? Vastates küsimusele, tõestab väitekiri 
püstitatud hüpoteesi, et kolmanda energiapaketi rakendamisega põhjustatud radikaalsed 
energiaturgu muutvad seadusandlikud meetmed ei vasta energiaturu tegelikule arengule, 
vaid on vastuolus selle arengusuunaga ja loovad olukorra, kus riigi energiajulgeolek 
satub ohtu. Lisaks põhjustavad sellised muudatused riikides, kus gaas on 
põhienergiaallikas ning mis on tihedas sõltuvuses ühest monopolistlikust gaasitarnijast, 
majanduslikku kahju kui neid rakendada enne kui on leitud alternatiivsed energiaallikad 
või võimalused energiatarnijate mitmekesistamiseks. 
 
Töö on jaotatud kolmeks osaks. Esimesed kaks osa kujundavad neile järgnevale 
uuringule raamistiku. Defineeritakse Euroopa Liidu ja Venemaa energiaalaste suhete 
põhijooned ja arutletakse nende üle. Tähelepanu pööratakse seejuures eriti Euroopa 
Liidu püüdlusele luua ühtne energiaturg ning Euroopa Liidu - Venemaa energiaalasele 
vastastikusele sõltuvusele. Iseloomustatakse Gazpromi kui Venemaa riikliku 
gaasimonopoli mõjukust gaasiimpordist tugevas sõltuvuses olevate riikide 
energiaturgudel ühise Euroopa Liidu energiaturu puudumisel. Erilise vaatluse all on 
seejuures olukord gaasist väga sõltuvates Balti riikides, mille puhul antakse ülevaade 
nende bilateraalsetest suhetest Gazpromiga, kui nende ainsa gaasi tarnijaga, ajalooliselt 
kujunenud Venemaa - Balti riikide poliitiliste suhete raames. Teine osa on pühendatud 
kolmanda energiapaketi olemuse lähemale uurimisele, seejuures on tähelepanu pööratud 
enim kõige problemaatilisemale ‘eraldamise’ põhimõttele ja selle mõjule Euroopa Liidu 
energiaturu edasisele struktuurile ja toimimisele. Selgitatakse kuidas äärmuslikud 
kolmanda energiapaketi regulatsioonid hakkavad mõjutama Euroopa gaasiturgu ning 
kirjeldatakse regulatsioonidega seonduvaid energiatarnijate peamisi muresid. 
 
Väitekirja empiirilises osas vaadeldakse kolmanda energiapaketi mõju energiaturule 
üksikriigi raames, Leedu näitel. Selles vaadeldakse Leedu energiaturu spetsiifikat ning 
iseloomustatakse riigi  suhteid selle energiaturu põhienergiaallika tarnija Gazpromiga, 
võttes arvesse riigi kuulumist suuremale Euroopa Liidu energiaturule ning sellega 
kaasnevaid asjaolusid. Samuti analüüsitakse kuidas Gazprom põhienergiaallika ainsa 
tarnijana reageeris Leedu valitsuse vastavatele sammudele. Tuginedes töö kahes 
esimeses osas esitatud argumentidele ja teoreetilisele raamistikule ning Leedu 
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energiaturu arengutendentsidele, võetakse arvesse järgnevate konfliktide tõenäosust 
ning järeldatakse milliseid riske kolmanda energiapaketi rakendamine Leedu 
energiajulgeolekule põhjustab.  
 
Uurimistööst järeldub, et Leedus, kus tuumaelektrijaamade sulgemise tagajärjel sai 
gaasist põhienergiaallikas, millega algas energiaturu paratamatu monopoliseerumise 
protsess ja kus kolmanda energiapaketi rakendamine algatab radikaalseid 
seaduspõhiseid turumuudatusi, eesmärgiga gaasiturgu liberaliseerida, toimub sama riigi 
poolt kahe smaaegselt algatatud vastanduva protsessi kokkupõrge. Provotseerides 
monopoli omavat Gazpromi kasutama erinevaid manipuleerimisvahendeid oma 
turupositsiooni kaitsmiseks seab selline vastuoluline situatsioon ohtu riigi 
energiajulgeoleku. 
 
Arvestades hiljutisi sündmusi ja võttes aluseks varasemad käitumistendentsid on 
gaasitarnijapoolsed manipuleerivad võtted tõenäolised. Alternatiivsete gaasitarnijate, -
energiaallikate ja energia-taristu ümberkorraldamise ressursside puudumist arvesse 
võttes, leiab autor, et kolmanda energiapaketi regulatsioonide täideviimine seab 
lühiajalises perspektiivis ohtu Leedu energiajulgeoleku ning ohustab riigi majandust. 
Autor jõuab järeldusele, et gaasi ja elektri tarnimise ja tootmise eraldamist ülekandest 
(unbundling) saab tõhusalt teostada vaid juhul kui kohalik energiaturg suudab 
monopoli-poolse manipuleerimise vältimiseks esmalt leida mitmekülgseid 
energiaallikaid ja alternatiivseid tarnijaid. 
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